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BLOWING HOT AND COLD ON
THE FROZEN TUNDRA:
A REVIEW OF ALASKA’S
QUASI-ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE
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LAURA L. FARLEY**
This Article takes a critical look at the quasi-estoppel doctrine as it
operates in Alaska.  First the Article compares the quasi-estoppel
doctrine with the equitable estoppel and collateral estoppel doc-
trines.  Next it examines Alaska cases that have interpreted the
quasi-estoppel doctrine.  The Article then makes suggestions for
how the doctrine could be refined and argues that if the sugges-
tions were adopted, the doctrine would be a more fair, valuable
tool for both litigants and courts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a case in which a dairy farmer, unable to meet his
debt obligations to the state, files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition
in federal court.  Suppose that he cooperates as the state repos-
sesses his chattels that secured the state’s loans.  Now suppose that
immediately after his debts are discharged by a bankruptcy court,
he files a lender liability suit, requesting cancellation of his indebt-
edness to the state, an injunction prohibiting the state’s collection
efforts, rescission of his contractual obligations to the state, and
monetary damages based on claims of misrepresentation, negli-
gence, and breach of fiduciary duty, among others.  This is pre-
cisely the affront to the judicial system that the Alaska Supreme
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Court sought to prevent in Wright v. State1 by invoking the doctrine
of quasi-estoppel against a dairy farmer who attempted to take ad-
vantage of these contradictory positions.2
Quasi-estoppel is an equitable doctrine3 that, where applica-
ble, prevents litigants from taking positions inconsistent with those
they have previously asserted.4  As a general proposition, the doc-
trine5 requires a party who has gained an advantage (or produced a
disadvantage) by asserting a particular position6 accept the burden
of asserting that position in subsequent proceedings.7  In essence,
the doctrine protects the integrity of the judicial process8 by pre-
venting litigants from “blow[ing] both hot and cold”9 where the as-
1. 824 P.2d 718 (Alaska 1992).
2. See id. at 721-22.
3. See Bromley v. Mitchell, 902 P.2d 797, 802 (Alaska 1995); In re Lampert,
896 P.2d 214, 220 (Alaska 1995).
4. See Union Oil Co. of Calif. v. State, 804 P.2d 62, 66 n.7 (Alaska 1990); Sea
Lion Corp. v. Air Logistics of Alaska, 787 P.2d 109, 114 n.2 (Alaska 1990).
5. Alaska’s quasi-estoppel doctrine is similar to what other jurisdictions call
“judicial estoppel.”  See Smith ex rel. Smith v. Marchant Enters., Inc., 791 P.2d
354, 356 (Alaska 1990) (implicitly equating quasi-estoppel and judicial estoppel);
cf. Rosa v. CWJ Contractors, Ltd., 664 P.2d 745, 751 n.12 (Haw. Ct. App. 1983)
(describing judicial estoppel as falling “[w]ithin quasi-estoppel”); Woods v.
Woods, 638 S.W.2d 403, 405-06 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that judicial estop-
pel “has been termed a quasi estoppel”).  Indeed, Alaska courts occasionally use
the terms interchangeably.  See, e.g., Union Oil Co., 804 P.2d at 66 n.7; Smith, 791
P.2d at 356.
6. See Jamison v. Consolidated Utils., Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102 (Alaska 1978)
(“Among the many considerations which may indicate that . . . quasi-estoppel
should be applied [is] whether the party asserting the inconsistent position has
gained an advantage or produced some disadvantage through the first position.”).
7. Noting that quasi-estoppel “springs from . . . [an] acceptance of benefits,”
the Alaska Supreme Court has stated:
It is a long-established principle of equity that no person will be allowed
to adopt that part of a transaction which is favorable to him, and reject
the rest to the injury of those from whom he derived the benefit.  It is a
plain principle of justice, of right, and of law, that a man can not accept
the benefits, and reject the burdens of a transaction.
Dressel v. Weeks, 779 P.2d 324, 332 (Alaska 1989) (citations and internal quota-
tion marks omitted); see also In re Davidson, 947 F.2d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir. 1991)
(“One form of estoppel, ‘quasi estoppel,’ forbids a party from accepting the bene-
fits of a transaction or statute and then subsequently taking an inconsistent posi-
tion to avoid the corresponding obligations or effects.”).
8. See Smith, 791 P.2d at 356, 358.
9. Lampert, 896 P.2d at 221 (quoting Godoy v. County of Hawaii, 354 P.2d
78, 82 (Haw. 1960)); cf. Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966, 970 n.13
(Alaska 1970).
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sertion of inconsistent positions would be unconscionable.10
“Unconscionable” generally is defined as grossly unfair, unjust, in-
equitable, oppressive, or unduly harsh.11  This doctrine provides the
practitioner a tool to appeal to the conscience of the court.12
Unfortunately, while quasi-estoppel can be useful to both liti-
gants and courts, Alaska’s fact-specific application of the doctrine
offers relatively little guidance on how to use it as a defense.  In
applying the doctrine, the Alaska Supreme Court presently con-
siders such factors as “whether the party asserting the inconsistent
position has gained an advantage or produced some disadvantage
through the first position; whether the inconsistency was of such
significance as to make the present assertion unconscionable; and
whether the first assertion was based on full knowledge of the
facts.”13  Because the concept of unconscionability, in particular, is
inherently vague, legal precedent is only moderately instructive.
This Article considers Alaska’s view of the quasi-estoppel
doctrine,14 which has also been recognized in several other jurisdic-
tions,15 and argues that the Alaska Supreme Court should refine
the test used in determining the proper application of the doctrine.
Part II of the Article summarizes the relationship between quasi-
estoppel and two other estoppel doctrines recognized in Alaska,16
10. See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 102 (“The essence of the doctrine of quasi-
estoppel is the existence of facts and circumstances making the assertion of an in-
consistent position unconscionable.”).
11. See id. at 102-03.
12. See Maynard v. State Farm
 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 902 P.2d 1328, 1330
(Alaska 1995).
13. Jamison, 576 P.2d at 103.
14. The only previous academic consideration of this issue appears to be a
brief discussion of Smith ex rel. Smith v. Marchant Enters., Inc., 791 P.2d 354
(Alaska 1990) in Jayne E. Powell & Ellen L. Lyons, Alaska Supreme Court Year
in Review 1990, 8 ALASKA L. REV. 71, 131-32 (1991).
15. See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1351, 1360 (D. Kan.
1995) (“The Tenth Circuit has also approved the doctrine of quasi-estoppel.”)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 138 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir.
1998); Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Bakie Logging, 824 P.2d 178, 187 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1992) (“Idaho also recognizes the doctrine of quasi estoppel.”); Hensgen v.
Silberman, 197 P.2d 356, 358-59 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948) (“[O]ur courts have
recognized [a] species of estoppel, called ‘quasi-estoppel,’ which is based upon the
principle that one cannot blow both hot and cold.”).  However, the doctrine has
also been rejected by some courts.  See, e.g., United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10,
19 n.7 (1st Cir. 1973) (noting the doctrine has been expressly rejected in the First
Circuit).
16. See infra notes 23-61 and accompanying text.
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equitable estoppel17 and collateral estoppel.18  Part III analyzes
Alaska cases that have examined the quasi-estoppel doctrine.19
Part IV discusses quasi-estoppel and judicial estoppel as they are
applied in other jurisdictions.20  Part V examines potential conflicts
between the quasi-estoppel doctrine and Alaska’s liberal pleading
rules.21  Part VI proposes certain refinements for Alaska courts to
consider when identifying the circumstances in which quasi-
estoppel should be invoked against a party asserting inconsistent
positions.22  The Article concludes that clarification of the doctrine
would make quasi-estoppel a more useful tool for litigants as well
as for the courts.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF QUASI-ESTOPPEL TO OTHER
ESTOPPEL DOCTRINES
Quasi-estoppel, like other estoppel doctrines, is equitable in
nature.23  It resembles other preclusion doctrines, such as equitable
estoppel and collateral estoppel, insofar as each of these doctrines
imbues the courts with authority to prevent parties from relitigat-
ing an established factual posture.24  As the Alaska Supreme Court
has stated, “[e]stoppel by any name is based primarily on consid-
erations of justice and fair play.”25
Despite the similarities between various types of estoppel, the
policy considerations underlying quasi-estoppel are distinct from
the other doctrines.  Alaska’s doctrine of quasi-estoppel is de-
signed to prevent injustice by precluding a party from asserting a
right inconsistent with a position previously taken, even where nei-
ther ignorance nor reliance on the part of the opposing party is
present.26  The intended beneficiary of this doctrine is the judicial
17. See Wright v. State, 824 P.2d 718, 721 (Alaska 1992).
18. See Shepherd v. Bering Sea Originals, 578 P.2d 587, 589 (Alaska 1978).  A
fourth estoppel doctrine – promissory estoppel – is also recognized in Alaska.  See
James v. State, 815 P.2d 352, 355-56 (Alaska 1991).  For a general discussion of
Alaska’s view of promissory estoppel, see Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of
Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263, 304-09 (1996).
19. See infra notes 62-120 and accompanying text
20. See infra notes 121-35 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 136-74 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 175-234 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
24. See Mark J. Plumer, Judicial Estoppel: The Refurbishing of a Judicial
Shield, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 409, 410 (1987).
25. In re Lampert, 896 P.2d 214, 221 (Alaska 1995) (citation omitted).
26. See Batey v. Batey, 933 P.2d 551, 554 (Alaska 1997) (Fabe, J., dissenting);
Jamison v. Consolidated Utils., Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102 & n.9 (Alaska 1978).
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system itself, rather than the litigants involved in a particular
case.27  Quasi-estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial process
by preventing litigants from casually adopting inconsistent posi-
tions for their own convenience.28  While similar to equitable es-
toppel and collateral estoppel in some respects, quasi-estoppel can
be distinguished from these doctrines in terms of the interests it
protects.
A. Equitable Estoppel
Perhaps quasi-estoppel is most similar to equitable estoppel,29
which also may prevent a party from asserting a position inconsis-
tent with one it previously has taken.30  Indeed, the Alaska Su-
preme Court has indicated that quasi-estoppel is a “species” of eq-
uitable estoppel.31  Equitable estoppel precludes a person from
asserting a right which he otherwise would have but for his previ-
ous acts or conduct proclaiming a contrary position and the reli-
ance thereon by another party.32  In Alaska, three essential ele-
ments are required for the application of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel: (1) the assertion by conduct or word of a position, (2)
reasonable reliance thereon by another party, and (3) resulting
prejudice.33
Despite their similarities, quasi-estoppel and equitable estop-
pel differ in certain important respects.34  In particular, equitable
27. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
28. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
29. See Smith v. Thompson, 923 P.2d 101, 104 (Alaska 1996) (describing
claims based on equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel as “related arguments”);
Lakeside Mall, Ltd. v. Hill, 826 P.2d 1137, 1142 n.12 (Alaska 1992) (discussing a
fact pattern that “does not fit neatly under either the doctrine of equitable or
quasi-estoppel but has elements of both”); see also University of Hawaii Prof’l
Assembly v. University of Hawaii, 659 P.2d 720, 725 (Haw. 1983) (describing
quasi-estoppel as a “close cousin to the doctrine of equitable estoppel”).
30. See United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92, 96 (9th Cir. 1970)
(“Equitable estoppel prevents a party from assuming inconsistent positions to the
detriment of another party.”) (citations omitted), cited in Jamison v. Consolidated
Utils., Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102 n.7 (Alaska 1978).
31. Lampert, 896 P.2d at 221 (quoting Godoy v. County of Hawaii, 354 P.2d
78, 82 (Haw. 1960)).
32. See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 102.
33. See id.
34. See Lampert, 896 P.2d at 221 & n.8; Jamison, 576 P.2d at 102.  Equitable
estoppel is, in turn, distinct from promissory estoppel, although the elements of
those two doctrines also are similar.  See James v. State, 815 P.2d 352, 355 n.9
(Alaska 1991).  The principal difference lies in the fact that promissory estoppel,
unlike equitable estoppel (or quasi-estoppel), can be applied “offensively.”  See
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estoppel focuses on the relationship between the parties,35 while
quasi-estoppel focuses on the interests of the court in promoting
consistency when inconsistency would produce an unconscionable
result.36  Thus, the Alaska Supreme Court’s present application of
quasi-estoppel requires a finding that the assertion of inconsistent
positions would be unconscionable.37  In contrast, although uncon-
scionability is a relevant consideration in analyzing equitable es-
toppel arguments,38 it apparently is not a prerequisite to that doc-
trine’s application.39
In addition, equitable estoppel typically applies only where
the party asserting inconsistent positions willfully causes another
to formulate a mistaken impression40 in reliance on the first party’s
                                                                                                                                
id.; see also Bubbel v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc., 682 P.2d 374, 380 n.7 (Alaska 1984).
Ignoring this difference, litigants occasionally invoke equitable estoppel or quasi-
estoppel when the potentially applicable doctrine is actually promissory estoppel.
See, e.g., Bubbel, 682 P.2d at 380 n.7; see also Holmes, supra note 18, at 304 n.108
(observing that “attorneys may erroneously plead equitable estoppel or quasi-
estoppel when the proper claim for relief is equitable promissory estoppel”).
35. See Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cited with
approval in Smith ex rel. Smith v. Marchant Enters., Inc., 791 P.2d 354, 356
(Alaska 1990).
36. See, e.g., Smith, 791 P.2d at 356 (noting that because the quasi-estoppel
doctrine is designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process, it focuses upon
the “involvement of the courts in promoting or permitting inconsistent results”).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has expressed the interest of the
courts as it pertains to the closely related judicial estoppel doctrine:
The tribunal in which the litigant made the first statement could also be
interested (there is no reason to think as a general proposition that one
statement is more likely than the other to be true), but it is not in a posi-
tion to do anything about its interest.  Therefore, for all practical pur-
poses, the interests of the second court are uniquely implicated and
threatened by the taking of an incompatible position.
Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 603-04 (9th Cir. 1996).
37. See Alaska Statebank v. Kirschbaum, 662 P.2d 939, 943 (Alaska 1983);
Jamison, 576 P.2d at 102.
38. See, e.g., East River Sav. Bank v. Secretary of HUD, 702 F. Supp. 448, 460
n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“The purpose of the equitable estoppel doctrine is to pre-
vent the infliction of unconscionable injury and loss upon one who has relied on
the promise of another.”).
39. See Altman v. Alaska Truss & Mfg. Co., 677 P.2d 1215, 1223 (Alaska
1983); see also Jamison, 576 P.2d at 102 (“Quasi-estoppel differs from other forms
of estoppel in that it appeals to the conscience of the court.”) (quoting Donaldson
v. LeNore, 540 P.2d 671, 674 (Ariz. 1975)).
40. See In re Lampert, 896 P.2d 214, 221 n.8 (Alaska 1995) (quoting Maria v.
Freitas, 832 P.2d 259, 264 (Haw. 1992)).
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representation.41  Quasi-estoppel, on the other hand, potentially is
applicable in the absence of reliance42 or intentional misrepresenta-
tion by the party asserting inconsistent positions.43
B. Collateral Estoppel
Quasi-estoppel also is related to collateral estoppel,44 which
the Alaska courts occasionally refer to as “issue preclusion.”45
Collateral estoppel “bars relitigation, even in an action on a differ-
ent claim, of all ‘issues of fact or law that were actually litigated
and necessarily decided’ in [a] prior proceeding.”46  Specifically,
collateral estoppel prevents a party from relitigating issues previ-
ously resolved against that party.47
41. See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 102; Arctic Contractors, Inc. v. State, 564 P.2d 30,
40 (Alaska 1977).  See generally Donaldson, 540 P.2d at 674 (observing that reli-
ance is “an element normally required of estoppels”), cited with approval in Jami-
son, 576 P.2d at 102 & nn.7 & 9.
42. See Batey v. Batey, 933 P.2d 551, 554 (Alaska 1997) (Fabe, J., dissenting)
(“Quasi-estoppel does not require the injured party to have relied on the es-
topped party’s conduct or statements.”); Alaska Statebank, 662 P.2d at 942
(stating that “reliance is not an element of a claim based on quasi-estoppel”); Ja-
mison, 576 P.2d at 102 (“Quasi-estoppel . . . does not require ignorance or reli-
ance as essential elements.”) (quoting Donaldson, 540 P.2d at 674); but cf. Jami-
son, 576 P.2d at 102-03 (“Among the many considerations which may indicate
that . . . the doctrine of quasi-estoppel should be applied [is] . . .  whether the in-
consistency was relied on by the party claiming estoppel to his detriment.”).
43. In Jamison, the Alaska Supreme Court cited with seeming approval
KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 486 P.2d 992 (Idaho 1971) and Fast v. Fast, 496 P.2d
171 (Kan. 1972).  See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 101 n.6, 102 & nn.7 & 10.  In KTVB,
the Idaho Supreme Court stated that “no concealment or misrepresentation of
existing facts . . . is a necessary ingredient” to the application of quasi-estoppel.
486 P.2d at 994 (quoting Clontz v. Fortner, 399 P.2d 949, 954 (Idaho 1965)); see
also Record Steel & Constr., Inc. v. Martel Constr., Inc., 923 P.2d 995, 999 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1996) (“Quasi-estoppel does not require a false representation.”).  In
Fast, the Kansas Supreme Court likewise indicated that quasi-estoppel may apply
where there is “nothing to show active misrepresentation or concealment.”  496
P.2d at 175.
44. See generally University of Hawaii Prof’l Assembly v. University of Ha-
waii, 659 P.2d 720, 726 (Haw. 1983) (“Estoppel by any name is based primarily on
considerations of justice and fair play.”), cited with approval in In re Lampert, 896
P.2d 214, 221 (Alaska 1995).
45. Campion v. Department of Community & Reg’l Affairs, 876 P.2d 1096,
1098 (Alaska 1994); Boyles v. State, 647 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
46. Campion, 876 P.2d at 1098 (citing Americana Fabrics v. L & L Textiles,
754 F.2d 1524, 1529 (9th Cir. 1985)).
47. See State v. United Cook Inlet Drift Ass’n, 895 P.2d 947, 950 n.7 (Alaska
1995).
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Collateral estoppel is similar to quasi-estoppel insofar as both
doctrines protect the interests of the judicial system.  However,
whereas quasi-estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial process
by preventing litigants from asserting inconsistent positions, the
principal objective underlying collateral estoppel is to “ensure the
finality of judgment, thereby ensuring a litigant’s peace of mind,
and to promote judicial economy.”48  Because these doctrines pro-
tect different interests, there are different prerequisites for their
applications.
The Alaska Supreme Court has held that collateral estoppel
should be applied only when three conditions have been met: (1)
the plea of collateral estoppel is being asserted against a party or
one in privity with a party to the first action; (2) the issue to be
precluded from relitigation by operation of the doctrine is identical
to that decided in the first action; and (3) the issue in the first ac-
tion was resolved by a final judgment on the merits.49  By contrast,
litigation may not be required under Alaska’s present formulation
of quasi-estoppel,50 which typically prevents a party from asserting
a position contrary to the one it successfully asserted previously.51
Additionally, privity may not be a necessary precondition to the
application of quasi-estoppel.52  Despite these differences, the two
doctrines are somewhat similar,53 and the principles underlying
48. Plumer, supra note 24, at 415 (comparing collateral estoppel with judicial
estoppel, a doctrine closely related to quasi-estoppel).
49. See McKean v. Municipality of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Alaska
1989).
50. See, e.g., Maynard v. State Farm Mut. Life Auto. Co., 902 P.2d 1328, 1330-
31 (Alaska 1995) (suggesting that quasi-estoppel might preclude the assertion of a
position inconsistent with one taken by the same party in pre-litigation corre-
spondence).
51. While prior judicial success may not be a prerequisite to the application of
quasi-estoppel (as it often is where the closely-related judicial estoppel doctrine is
involved, see Moore v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 808 F.2d 1147, 1153 n.6 (5th
Cir. 1987)), the fact that a party was successful in asserting its initial position in-
creases the likelihood that its subsequent assertion of an inconsistent position will
be deemed unconscionable, which is a prerequisite to the application of quasi-
estoppel.  See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 102.
52. See infra notes 218-24 and accompanying text.
53. See Massaglia v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 379, 387 (1959) (“[C]ollateral es-
toppel . . . [and] quasi-estoppel . . . have been urged on courts as different names
for the bar which estoppel invokes.”).  See generally Willard v. Ward, 875 P.2d
441, 444 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994) (“[T]he application of estoppel in any form is an
issue of equitable cognizance.”).
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collateral estoppel may be instructive in analyzing quasi-estoppel
issues.54
C. The Necessity of Three Preclusion Doctrines
The recent development of Alaska’s quasi-estoppel doctrine
raises the question: Does quasi-estoppel protect an interest that
could not adequately be protected by either equitable estoppel or
collateral estoppel?  At least two courts have answered that ques-
tion affirmatively.  The Sixth Circuit recently stated that judicial
estoppel, a doctrine closely related to quasi-estoppel, “may apply
in contexts when other forms of estoppel do not.”55  In a much ear-
lier case,  Scarano v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey,56 the Third Cir-
cuit indicated in greater detail that collateral estoppel and equita-
ble estoppel would be ineffective in preventing a litigant from
reversing his position in bad faith from one trial to another.57  In
that case, the plaintiff was an injured employee who brought suit
against his employer under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act,
alleging that he was “totally disabled.”58  After a jury verdict was
entered in his favor and the plaintiff settled with his employer, he
demanded that he be reinstated in his former job pursuant to the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement.59  The Third Circuit ul-
timately held that the plaintiff would be estopped from relitigating
the issue of his physical ability to perform the work in question.60
Although the court did not specifically use the term “quasi-
estoppel,”61 it is clear the estoppel doctrine was utilized to protect
the integrity of the courts.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 19 n.7 (1st Cir. 1973)
(rejecting defendant’s quasi-estoppel argument as “nothing more than a restate-
ment of his already rejected claim of collateral estoppel”).
55. United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 275 (6th Cir. 1995).
56. 203 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1953).
57. See id. at 512-14.
58. Id. at 511.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 512.
61. See id. at 512-13 (“The ‘estoppel’ of which, for want of a more precise
word, we here speak is but a particular limited application of what is sometimes
said to be a general rule that ‘a party to litigation will not be permitted to assume
inconsistent or mutually contradictory positions with respect to the same matter
in the same or a successive series of suits.’” (citation omitted)).
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III. ALASKA’S INTERPRETATION OF THE
QUASI-ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE
Thus far, the Alaska courts have not developed a precise for-
mula by which to determine the circumstances under which the
quasi-estoppel doctrine should be applied.62  In the two decades
since the quasi-estoppel doctrine was adopted,63 Alaska courts
have applied or considered the doctrine in probate proceedings,64
condemnation proceedings,65 quiet title actions,66 workers’ compen-
sation proceedings,67 declaratory judgment actions,68 tax appeals,69
62. See In re Lampert, 896 P.2d 214, 221 (Alaska 1995) (noting that the doc-
trine is “not rigidly applied”).
63. See Jamison v. Consolidated Util., Inc., 576 P.2d 97 (Alaska 1978).
64. See, e.g., Lampert, 896 P.2d 214 (discussed infra notes 96-116 and accom-
panying text).
65. See, e.g., Keener v. State, 889 P.2d 1063, 1067-68 (Alaska 1995) (holding
that the state was not precluded by the quasi-estoppel doctrine from asserting a
right-of-way over property owned by the appellants, primarily because the state
neither had gained an advantage nor produced a disadvantage as the result of its
prior representation).
66. See, e.g., Dressel v. Weeks, 779 P.2d 324, 331-33 (Alaska 1989) (applying
quasi-estoppel to prevent a party who had benefited from an invalid sale of cer-
tain real property from subsequently asserting title to that property).  In reaching
its holding, the Dressel court noted that the quasi-estoppel doctrine “has fre-
quently been applied to real property [matters].”  Id. at 332.
67. See, e.g., Smith ex rel. Smith v. Marchant Enters., Inc., 791 P.2d 354, 356-
59 (Alaska 1990) (declining to apply quasi-estoppel to bar employee’s workers’
compensation appeal where positions employee previously had asserted were not
inconsistent); Municipality of Anchorage v. Leigh, 823 P.2d 1241, 1245-46 (Alaska
1992) (holding that quasi-estoppel doctrine did not preclude employer’s argument
in workers’ compensation appeal because employer’s positions were consistent);
see also Wausau Ins. Cos. v. Van Biene, 847 P.2d 584, 587-88 (Alaska 1993)
(noting that quasi-estoppel can apply in workers’ compensation proceedings).
68. See Maynard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 902 P.2d 1328 (Alaska
1995).  In Maynard, an insured brought a declaratory judgment action against its
insurer seeking a determination that the insurer had no right of subrogation
against him.  See id. at 1329.  The Alaska Supreme Court held that the insurer was
not barred by the quasi-estoppel doctrine from changing its theory of recovery to
one premised upon a right to reimbursement, because its assertion of that posi-
tion, while perhaps inconsistent with its previous assertion of a right to subroga-
tion, was not unconscionable.  See id. at 1330-31.
69. See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. State, 804 P.2d 62, 66 n.7 (Alaska 1990)
(holding that the state was not estopped from using a particular accounting
method in computing exempt business income where its apparently inconsistent
position in prior litigation actually resulted from it having “misspoke[n]” on that
occasion).
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bankruptcy proceedings,70 divorce actions,71 and various breach of
contract72 and tort actions.73 The application of quasi-estoppel in
each of these cases appears to have turned on the specific facts.
The Alaska Supreme Court also has concluded that the doctrine
may apply in administrative and other quasi-judicial proceedings,74
and presumably would hold that it can be applied in criminal pro-
ceedings as well.75
70. See, e.g., Wright v. State, 824 P.2d 718, 720-22 (Alaska 1992) (holding that
the appellant was precluded by the quasi-estoppel doctrine from asserting claims
he had failed to disclose in his previous bankruptcy proceedings).
71. See, e.g., Batey v. Batey, 933 P.2d 551, 554-55 (Alaska 1997) (Fabe, J. dis-
senting) (advocating the application of quasi-estoppel to prevent a party from de-
nying the validity of a marriage after “reap[ing] the benefits of holding himself
out as married . . . for more than twenty years”).
72. See, e.g., Bromley v. Mitchell, 902 P.2d 797, 802-03 (Alaska 1995) (holding
that quasi-estoppel did not preclude a defendant who had contracted to repair the
plaintiffs’ boat from asserting a forum non conveniens argument that was not in-
consistent with the position it had taken in a previous motion for summary judg-
ment).
73. See, e.g., Smith v. Stratton, 835 P.2d 1162, 1166 & n.9 (Alaska 1992)
(holding that quasi-estoppel precluded the alleged tortfeasor in a personal injury
action from asserting a statute of limitations defense where she had been instru-
mental in inducing the plaintiffs to postpone prosecution of the action); Wright,
824 P.2d at 720-22 (holding that appellant was precluded from asserting lender
liability claims that were inconsistent with position he had taken in previous pro-
ceeding).
74. See Wausau Ins. Cos. v. Van Biene, 847 P.2d 584, 587-88 (Alaska 1993)
(observing that “implicit in [Smith ex rel. Smith v. Marchant Enters., Inc., 791
P.2d 354 (Alaska 1990)] was this court’s recognition that if all the elements [are]
present, quasi-estoppel . . . [is] applicable to [a] workers’ compensation proceed-
ing,” which is “quasi-judicial” in nature).
75. The Alaska Supreme Court has indicated that other estoppel doctrines
may apply in criminal cases under appropriate circumstances.  See, e.g., Kott v.
State, 678 P.2d 386, 391-93 (Alaska 1984) (discussing collateral estoppel).  In ad-
dition, other courts have held that quasi-estoppel’s close analogue, judicial estop-
pel, can be applied against either the defendant or the government in criminal
proceedings.  See, e.g., State v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 304 (Ariz. 1996) (holding
that “the doctrine of judicial estoppel is no less applicable in a criminal than in a
civil trial [and a]ny other rule would permit absurd results”), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 485 (1997).  But cf. Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1070 (9th Cir. 1997)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“There is, in fact, a long line of cases that says, if only
by way of dicta, that judicial estoppel will not apply against the government in
criminal cases.”).  Nevertheless, criminal proceedings raise important due process
concerns, and at least one court has refused to apply the doctrine of judicial es-
toppel to bar a criminal defendant from asserting a claim based on innocence.  See
Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 453 (9th Cir. 1991).
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The application of quasi-estoppel is generally a fact-sensitive
matter76 in which legal precedent may offer courts relatively little
guidance.77 Nevertheless, in considering how the Alaska courts
should apply the doctrine in the future,78 it is undoubtedly useful to
review the two Alaska cases in which the doctrine has been dis-
cussed in the most detail, Jamison v. Consolidated Utilities, Inc.79
and In re Lampert.80
A. Jamison v. Consolidated Utilities, Inc.
The Alaska Supreme Court first adopted the quasi-estoppel
doctrine81 in Jamison v. Consolidated Utilities, Inc.82  Jamison in-
volved a claim by employees of a utility company for wages alleg-
edly due under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement be-
tween the company and the employees’ union.83  The employees
argued that the company was estopped from denying that wages
were due under the agreement because it had asserted the validity
of the agreement in prior agency hearings addressing its applica-
tion for a rate increase.84
76. See Wright, 824 P.2d at 721 (Alaska 1992) (noting that “application of the
doctrine of quasi estoppel rests on findings of fact” (citation omitted)); Jamison v.
Consolidated Utils., Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102 n.6 (Alaska 1978) (“[A]ccording to the
doctrine of quasi-estoppel[, the court’s] attention must be focused upon the spe-
cific facts and circumstances of the case before it.” (citation omitted)); id. at 102
(“Th[e] determination is essentially a factual one.”); cf. KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City,
486 P.2d 992, 995 (Idaho 1971) (“[T]he essence of the proper application of the
doctrine of quasi estoppel is the focus of the Court’s attention upon the specific
facts and circumstances of the case at bar.”).
77. See, e.g., Searfus v. Northern Gas Co. 472 P.2d 966, 970 n.13 (Alaska
1970) (finding, without elaboration, that the quasi-estoppel cases relied upon by
the appellant were “inapposite”); KTVB, 486 P.2d at 995 (finding that prior cases
were not persuasive in light of the fact-specific nature of quasi-estoppel issues).
78. See infra notes 136-234 and accompanying text.
79. 576 P.2d 97 (Alaska 1978).
80. 896 P.2d 214 (Alaska 1995).
81. See Smith ex rel. Smith v. Marchant Enters., Inc., 791 P.2d 354, 356
(Alaska 1990).
82. 576 P.2d 97 (Alaska 1978).  There is a passing reference to the doctrine in
one earlier Alaska case.  See Searfus, 472 P.2d at 970 n.13.  The Searfus court did
not analyze the quasi-estoppel doctrine in any depth, observing only that the ap-
pellant’s reliance on the doctrine was without merit and that the authorities on
which she had relied (which were not identified) were “inapposite.”  Id.
83. See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 98.
84. See id. at 101.  In essence, the employees’ position was that the company
had based its request for a rate increase in part on the anticipated additional costs
attributable to the wage increase provided for in the collective bargaining agree-
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The Alaska Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing
“a species of estoppel, sometimes referred to as quasi-estoppel,
which precludes a party from taking a position inconsistent with
one he has previously taken where circumstances render assertion
of the second position unconscionable.”85  In determining whether
the assertion of inconsistent positions would be unconscionable
under this doctrine, the court identified a number of pertinent is-
sues, such as whether an advantage had been gained or a disadvan-
tage produced, the magnitude of the inconsistency, whether the
changed circumstances tended to justify the inconsistency, whether
the inconsistency was relied upon, and whether the first assertion
was made with full knowledge of the facts.86  Considerations of par-
ticular significance in Jamison were whether the utility company
had obtained an advantage (or produced a disadvantage) as a re-
sult of its initial assertion, and whether the employees had relied
on that assertion to their detriment.87 According to the court’s
analysis, an affirmative response to those inquiries would support a
finding of unconscionability.88
In considering these issues, the Alaska Supreme Court con-
cluded that the company’s position in the agency hearings and its
litigation posture were inconsistent89 because the company had ne-
glected to inform the agency that the company considered the
wage increase provided for in the collective bargaining agreement
to be contingent upon approval of the company’s application for a
rate increase.90  The court nevertheless concluded that because the
plaintiffs were aware of this omission, they could not reasonably
have relied upon or been prejudiced by it.91  Reliance can be an
important factor though it is not an essential element to asserting
quasi-estoppel analysis.  However, in Jamison, the employees’
knowledge of the facts precluded them from claiming detrimental
reliance.92  In addition, the court concluded that the company had
gained no advantage from its omission because the rate increase
the company was granted at the conclusion of the agency hearings
                                                                                                                                
ment.  See id. at 99.  The company, on the other hand, claimed that the antici-
pated wage increase was contingent upon the agency’s approval of its requested
rate increase.  See id. at 103.
85. Id. at 101-02.
86. See id. at 102-03.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Inconsistency is a threshold requirement for the application of quasi-
estoppel.  See infra notes 136-74 and accompanying text.
90. See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 103.
91. See id.
92. See id.
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did not reflect the wage increase provided for in the collective bar-
gaining agreement.93  Based on these findings, the court concluded
that the company was not estopped from taking the position that
approval of its request for a rate increase was necessary to effect
the wage increase.94  In essence, because full knowledge of the po-
sition taken by the company prevented disadvantage to the em-
ployees, it could not be considered unjust or unconscionable.95
B. In re Lampert
The only other case in which the Alaska Supreme Court has
analyzed the quasi-estoppel doctrine in depth is In re Lampert.96
Although Lampert actually arose under Hawaii law,97 the case is
instructive in analyzing Alaska’s view of quasi-estoppel because
the Alaska Supreme Court expressly relied on Hawaii law in
adopting the doctrine.98  In addition, the trial court in Lampert spe-
cifically indicated that the result in the case would have been the
same under Alaska law.99
Lampert involved an action by an individual (and subse-
quently his estate)100 to rescind an earlier estate plan, formulated
by plaintiff and his wife, which conveyed a condominium to his
stepdaughter.101  The plaintiff’s stepdaughter argued that while the
conveyance technically may have been invalid,102 the quasi-estoppel
doctrine prohibited the plaintiff from contesting her ownership of
the property.103  The trial court agreed and granted the stepdaugh-
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 103.
96. 896 P.2d 214 (Alaska 1995).
97. See id. at 220.
98. See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 102 n.7 (citing Godoy v. County of Hawaii, 354
P.2d 78 (Haw. 1960)).
99. See Lampert, 896 P.2d at 217.  However, the Alaska Supreme Court did
not reach that particular issue.  See id.
100. The original plaintiff died a few months after commencing the litigation,
and his estate was then substituted for him as a party.  See id. at 216, 217-18.
101. See id. at 215-16.
102. Although the plaintiff had quitclaimed the condominium property to his
stepdaughter, the plaintiff’s wife had not executed the quitclaim deeds.  See id. at
216.  Because the property had been held by the plaintiff and his wife in a tenancy
by the entirety, and neither spouse can unilaterally convey such an interest in
property under Hawaii law, no legal interest had been transferred by the quit-
claim deeds executed by the plaintiff in favor of the stepdaughter.  See id. at 216,
220.
103. See id. at 217.
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ter’s motion for summary judgment.104  The plaintiff then ap-
pealed.105
Citing Godoy v. County of Hawaii,106 the Lampert court noted
that quasi-estoppel is a variation of the equitable estoppel doctrine
based on the maxim that “one cannot blow both hot and cold.”107
The court then articulated the following general principles that
may provide guidance to future courts applying the doctrine:
Quasi-estoppel is based upon the broad equitable principle . . .
that a person, with full knowledge of the facts, shall not be per-
mitted to act in a manner inconsistent with his former position or
conduct to the injury of another.  To constitute this sort of es-
toppel the act of the party against whom the estoppel is sought
must have gained some advantage for himself or produced some
disadvantage to another, or the person invoking the estoppel
must have been induced to change his position, or by reason
thereof the rights of other parties must have intervened.108
Applying these principles to the facts before it, the court
noted that the plaintiff’s litigation position was directly contrary to
his original intent to convey his interest in the condominium to his
stepdaughter.109  The court also found that the plaintiff had exe-
cuted the conveyance with full knowledge of the facts,110 and that
his conveyance of the property to his stepdaughter therefore must
be deemed to have been informed and purposeful.111
The court also concluded that the plaintiff’s change of posi-
tions would work to the stepdaughter’s disadvantage.112  In par-
ticular, the stepdaughter, who was in her late sixties and living on a
fixed income, had relied on rental income from the property as the
result of the plaintiff’s acquiescence in her ownership of it.113  In
addition, because of the manner in which the estate plan had been
structured, the stepdaughter stood to inherit very little unless the
conveyance was upheld.114 Under these circumstances, the court
104. See id. at 217, 220.
105. See id. at 217.
106. 354 P.2d 78 (Haw. 1960).  The Alaska Supreme Court also had relied
upon Godoy in Jamison.  See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 102 n.7.
107. Lampert, 896 P.2d at 221 (quoting Godoy, 354 P.2d at 82).
108. Id. (bracketing omitted) (quoting Godoy, 354 P.2d at 82-83).
109. See id.
110. Among other things, the plaintiff had been advised by an attorney in con-
nection with the transaction.  See id. at 214.
111. See id.  Indeed, the decision to convey the property had originated with
the plaintiff and his attorney.  See id. at 222.
112. See id. at 221.
113. See id. at 221-22.
114. See id. at 222.
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concluded that estopping the plaintiff from claiming ownership in
the property would serve notions of justice and fair play.115  The
court therefore affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judg-
ment in favor of the stepdaughter.116
C. An Analysis of Alaska’s Leading Quasi-Estoppel Cases
A careful analysis of Alaska’s quasi-estoppel doctrine, as best
defined by the Jamison and Lampert courts, suggests that the ap-
propriate test to be applied remains unclear.  For example, neither
court specified the degree to which the positions at issue must be
inconsistent.  Although the Jamison court stated that it would con-
sider the magnitude of the inconsistency,117 this formulation sheds
little light on exactly where the line should be drawn.  The prior in-
consistent statement at issue in Jamison was made during an
agency hearing,118 whereas the prior “assertion” in Lampert was an
earlier conveyance of property.119  It is not clear from these factual
nuances whether the courts give more weight to statements made
in judicial or administrative proceedings when considering whether
to invoke the quasi-estoppel doctrine.  Furthermore, because the
Jamison and  Lampert courts were not required to decide whether
privity between the parties was required, this may be an open issue
as well.120  Because so many questions surrounding the application
of Alaska’s quasi-estoppel doctrine remain unanswered, Alaska
litigants should look to factors considered by other jurisdictions in
analyzing which estoppel test likely will be applied.
IV. COMPARING ALASKA’S QUASI-ESTOPPEL WITH JUDICIAL
ESTOPPEL IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Because the Alaska Supreme Court essentially has equated
quasi-estoppel with judicial estoppel,121 it is instructive to review
briefly case law from jurisdictions applying both doctrines.  At
least thirty-three states122 thus far have adopted some form of
115. See id.; see also Batey v. Batey, 933 P.2d 551, 554 (Alaska 1997) (Fabe, J.,
dissenting) (observing that quasi-estoppel involves “[b]asic notions of equity,
fairness, and justice”).
116. See Lampert, 896 P.2d at 222.
117. See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 102-03.
118. See id. at 101.
119. See Lampert, 896 P.2d at 221.
120. See infra notes 218-24 and accompanying text.
121. See Smith ex rel. Smith v. Marchant Enters., Inc., 791 P.2d 354, 356
(Alaska 1990).
122. At least three states have rejected the doctrine of judicial estoppel out-
right, and various other states have not yet adopted the doctrine.  See, e.g.,
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quasi-estoppel or judicial estoppel.123  Despite general acceptance
of the doctrine, however, the specific criteria used by various juris-
dictions in applying the doctrine varies considerably.124
A thorough review of judicial estoppel cases from other ju-
risdictions reveals that three principal factors are considered by
most courts in applying the doctrine: prior success, privity, and re-
liance or prejudice.125  However, even as far as these factors are
concerned, the courts appear to be hopelessly split.126  The only
clear “majority” rule requires that a party’s prior inconsistent as-
sertion be judicially adopted before judicial estoppel can be in-
voked.127  This requirement is sometimes referred to as the “prior
success rule.”128  Prior success is measured not in terms of whether
a party prevails in a lawsuit, but rather in terms of whether a court
adopted the party’s original assertion.129  The policy underlying the
                                                                                                                                
Douglas W. Henkin, Judicial Estoppel – Beating Shields Into Swords and Back
Again, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1711, 1720 (1991) (“Massachusetts, South Carolina,
and Louisiana have rejected judicial estoppel outright.”); Rand G. Boyers, Com-
ment, Precluding Inconsistent Statements: The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel, 80
NW. U. L. REV. 1244, 1268 (1986) (noting that “South Carolina has not adopted
the doctrine of judicial estoppel”).
123. See Henkin, supra note 122, app. at 1756-60.
124. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 122, at 1713 (“Even those jurisdictions that
accept the doctrine cannot agree on its purpose or requirements.”); Plumer, supra
note 24, at 410-11 (“Although several courts have defined judicial estoppel and
have identified the doctrine’s essential elements, each court tends to apply a dif-
ferent construction of the rule.  Thus, no single formulation of the doctrine has
gained widespread acceptance.” (citations omitted)); Eric Schreiber, The Judici-
ary Says You Can’t Have It Both Ways: Judicial Estoppel –  A Doctrine Precluding
Inconsistent Positions, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 324 (1996) (“Courts that apply
judicial estoppel have interpreted its policies and elements variously, while other
courts have rejected the doctrine outright.”).
125. See Henkin, supra note 122, app. at 1756-60 (listing criteria used by vari-
ous jurisdictions in applying judicial estoppel).
126. See id. at 1722-23 (discussing the federal circuits’ inconsistent application
of prerequisites to the judicial estoppel doctrine).
127. See, e.g., Stevens Technical Servs., Inc., v. Steamship Brooklyn, 885 F.2d
584, 588 (9th Cir. 1989); Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv.
Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1548 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that it would apply judicial es-
toppel only “if a party prevails in Suit #1 on the basis of a position inconsistent
with that latterly taken”).
128. Yanez v. United States, 753 F.Supp. 309, 313 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1990), rev’d,
989 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1993).
129. See Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1982); see
also Schreiber, supra note 124, at 327 (“It is important to note that prior success
for the purposes of judicial estoppel does not mean that the party won the lawsuit,
but rather, that the court in the first lawsuit accepted the questioned statement or
assertion as true.”).
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prior success rule is that only when a party against whom judicial
estoppel is asserted enjoyed some prior success “is there a risk of
inconsistent results and a threat to the integrity of the judicial
process.”130  Only a small minority of courts permit the application
of judicial estoppel in the absence of prior success.131
In terms of the other two factors generally considered by the
courts, privity and reliance or prejudice, no clear rules have yet
emerged.  Some courts require that the party asserting judicial es-
toppel have been a party to the first suit in which the inconsistent
position was asserted.132  Others impose no such requirement.133
Similarly, whereas some courts require demonstration of reliance
by the party attempting to invoke the doctrine,134 others will apply
judicial estoppel in the absence of prejudice to the opposing
party.135 Despite the apparent confusion surrounding these issues, it
may be useful for Alaska courts to consider the choices made in
other jurisdictions in refining similar elements of Alaska’s quasi-
estoppel test.
V. THE IMPACT OF ALASKA’S LIBERAL PLEADING RULES
ON THE QUASI-ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e)(2),136 which authorizes
the pleading of alternative claims or defenses137 “regardless of con-
130. Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 452 (9th Cir. 1991).
131. See, e.g., Stevens Technical Servs., 885 F.2d at 589 (holding that judicial
estoppel may be invoked, even where the party was unsuccessful in asserting in-
consistent positions, if the party engaged in “fast and loose” behavior that un-
dermines the integrity of the court); Patriot Cinemas Inc. v. General Cinema
Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 212 (1st Cir. 1987).
132. See, e.g., Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1579
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that it would not apply judicial estoppel “in favor of a
total stranger to the first phase of the dispute”); McClintock v. McCall, 522 P.2d
343, 346 (Kan. 1974) (requiring same parties); Norrell v. Electric & Water Plant
Bd. of Frankfort, 557 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
133. See, e.g., Edwards, 690 F.2d at 598 (“[J]udicial estoppel may be applied
even if  . . . privity does not exist.”).
134. See, e.g., Young v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 882 F.2d 633, 639 (2d
Cir. 1989) (“The key ingredient, however, is reliance.”).
135. See, e.g., Edwards, 690 F.2d at 598 (“[J]udicial estoppel may be applied
even if detrimental reliance . . . does not exist.”); Tenneco Chems. v. Willam T.
Burnett & Co., 691 F.2d 658, 665 (4th Cir. 1982) (“Reliance . . . is not a factor to
be considered in judicial estoppel cases.” (citation omitted)).
136. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2).
137. See Colt Indus. Operating Co. v. Frank W. Murphy Mfr., Inc., 822 P.2d
925, 931 (Alaska 1991) (“Alaska Civil Rule 8(e)(2) permits parties to set forth
arguments in the alternative.”); Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n v. College Enters.,
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sistency,”138 may limit judicial application of quasi-estoppel.  In
Konstantinidis v. Chen,139 a federal appellate court concluded that
the judicial estoppel doctrine is inconsistent with modern pleading
rules.140  In particular, the doctrine is inconsistent with Rule 8(e)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the text of which is virtu-
ally identical to Alaska Rule 8(e)(2).141  Because the Alaska Su-
preme Court essentially has equated quasi-estoppel with judicial
estoppel,142 and specifically relied on Konstantinidis in doing so,143
there presumably are circumstances under which the application of
quasi-estoppel likewise would be inconsistent with the federal
rule’s Alaska counterpart.144
Both the federal and state procedural rules145 are intended to
discourage parties from selecting in advance and to their detriment
                                                                                                                                
Inc., 455 P.2d 215, 216 (Alaska 1969) (citing Rule 8(e)(2) for the proposition that
“a litigant may plead in the alternative”).
138. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2); see also Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 455 P.2d at
216 (“It is elementary . . . that a litigant may . . . advance inconsistent claims or
defenses.”) (citing Rule 8(e)(2)); cf. Earven v. Smith, 621 P.2d 41, 43 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1980) (stating that comparable Arizona rule “specifically sanction[s] incon-
sistent pleading”).
139. 626 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
140. See id. at 938.
141. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2).  Although the Konstantinidis court did not specifi-
cally discuss Rule 8(e)(2), it adopted the analysis in Parkinson v. California Co.,
where the court did rely upon the rule.  See Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d
432, 438 (10th Cir. 1956).
142. See supra note 5.
143. See Smith ex rel. Smith v. Marchant Enters., Inc., 791 P.2d 354, 356
(Alaska 1990) (stating that Alaska has adopted the judicial estoppel doctrine at
issue in Konstantinidis under the “rubric” of quasi-estoppel).
144. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2).  The Alaska rule is patterned after (and virtu-
ally identical to) the federal rule.  See generally Jonz v. Garrett/Airesearch Corp.,
490 P.2d 1197, 1198 n.3 (Alaska 1971) (“The Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure . . .
[were] modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
145. Numerous other states have rules similar to the Alaska and federal rules.
See, e.g., Glover v. Giraldo, 824 P.2d 552, 556 (Wyo. 1992) (“The Wyoming Rules
of Civil Procedure are patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Rule 8(e)(2) is identical in both.”); Giron v. Housing Auth., 393 So.2d 1267, 1271
(La. 1981) (analyzing a Louisiana rule patterned after Federal Rule 8(e));
McCormick v. Kopmann, 161 N.E.2d 720, 727 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959) (discussing an
Illinois rule “modeled after Rule 8(e)(2) of the Federal Rules”); Shapiro v. Solo-
mon, 126 A.2d 654, 657 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) (quoting a New Jersey
rule “[m]odeled upon Federal Civil Rule 8(e)”).  See generally Henkin, supra note
122, at 1716 (describing the “practice of permitting inconsistent and alternative
pleading” as “now almost universally accepted”).
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the factual or legal theories on which they will rely,146 and to pro-
mote the full and final resolution of disputes in a single judicial
proceeding.147 While the Alaska courts have not adopted the Kon-
stantinidis court’s implicit conclusion that Rule 8(e)(2) precludes
the application of quasi-estoppel,148 the rule undoubtedly limits the
circumstances under which the doctrine can apply.149
In Wright v. Vickaryous,150 for example, the Alaska Supreme
Court cited Rule 8(e)(2)151 in rejecting the argument that an incon-
sistency between the plaintiffs’ original complaint and a proposed
amended complaint, standing alone, precluded the amendment.152
The court noted that “[t]he fact that an amendment involves a de-
parture from the facts previously alleged is no bar to its allowance,
since consistency in pleadings is not required.”153  Instead, the court
146. Cf. Edward Greenband Enters. v. Pepper, 538 P.2d 389, 391 (Ariz. 1975)
(“[T]he policy behind the rule . . . [is to] ‘prevent [the pleading party’s] being
forced to elect in advance and at his peril which theory he will proceed upon.’”)
(quoting Sligh v. Watson, 214 P.2d 123, 125 (Ariz. 1950)) (construing Arizona
rule).  A similar rationale underlies the rule permitting plaintiffs to pursue alter-
native relief against multiple defendants in a single action.  ALASKA R. CIV. P.
20(a).  Both Rule 8(e)(2) and Rule 20(a) “[s]pecifically allow parties to pursue
. . . inconsistent claims.”  Brown v. United States, 976 F.2d 1104, 1108 (7th Cir.
1992) (discussing the Alaska rules’ federal counterparts).
147. See Glover, 824 P.2d at 556 (“Alternative and inconsistent pleading . . .
articulates the philosophy that parties who are given the capacity to present their
entire controversies should in fact do so.”); United States v. G & H Mach., 92
F.R.D. 465, 467 (S.D. Ill. 1981) (observing that the federal rule is “essential to a
full presentation of all relevant facts and legal theories at trial and final settle-
ment of disputes on their merits”) (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1282, at 368 (1969)).
148. This conclusion is implicit in Konstantinidis (as opposed to being the ex-
press holding of the case) only in the sense that the court was considering judicial
estoppel, rather than quasi-estoppel, see Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933,
936-40 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  The two doctrines may not be precisely the same.  See,
e.g., Sailes v. Jones, 499 P.2d 721, 725-26 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (analyzing quasi-
estoppel and judicial estoppel somewhat differently); see also Przybylski v. Otis
Elevator Co., No. 05-92-02291-CV, 1994 WL 9113, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 13,
1994) (describing the two doctrines as “related” concepts).
149. Cf. Rosa v. CWJ Contractors, Ltd., 664 P.2d 745, 751 n.12, 752 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1983) (characterizing judicial estoppel as a variation of quasi-estoppel, and
concluding that those doctrines cannot be interpreted to preclude the inconsistent
pleading authorized by Rule 8(e)(2)’s Hawaii counterpart).
150. 598 P.2d 490 (Alaska 1979).
151. See id. at 496 n.18.
152. See id. at 496.
153. Id. (quoting 3 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §
15.08[2], at 15-71 (2d ed. 1948) (footnote omitted)); cf. MacCollum v. Perkinson,
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suggested that a party is estopped from pleading inconsistently
only if one of the positions was asserted in bad faith.154
Inconsistent statements authorized by Rule 8(e)(2) are, by the
rule’s express terms, subject to the requirements of Rule 11 of the
Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.155  Alaska Rule 11 (which, like
Rule 8(e)(2), is virtually identical to its federal counterpart)156 pro-
hibits taking any position for an improper purpose.157  Rule 11 is
violated by assertions made in bad faith.158  Rule 8(e)(2)’s incorpo-
ration of Rule 11’s “improper purpose” standard makes it clear
that Rule 8(e)(2) does not authorize inconsistent assertions made
in bad faith,159 and suggests that the key to analyzing the interplay
between Rule 8(e)(2) and the quasi-estoppel doctrine often will
involve determining whether an inconsistent  position would vio-
late Rule 11.160
As an ancillary matter, this analysis may provide a basis for
defining the quasi-estoppel doctrine’s elusive unconscionability re-
quirement.161  Courts in other jurisdictions with variations of Rule
                                                                                                                                
913 P.2d 1097, 1107 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting the contention that “leave to
file a second amended complaint should have been denied because the new
claims asserted by [the plaintiff] were inconsistent with his previously asserted . . .
theory” because parties can plead “alternatively and inconsistently” under Rule
8(e)(2)’s Arizona counterpart).
154. See Wright, 598 P.2d at 496.
155. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2).
156. See Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1227-28 & n.6
(Alaska 1992).
157. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 11.
158. See Keen v. Ruddy, 784 P.2d 653, 658 (Alaska 1989) (noting that the
pleading standards established by Rule 11 are more stringent than mere “good
faith”); Sanuita v. Common Laborer’s & Hod Carriers Union of Am., Local 341,
402 P.2d 199, 200 (Alaska 1965) (stating that “the overlying purpose of the rule
has been to insure . . . good faith”).
159. See Plumer, supra note 24, at 422 (“[R]ule 8(e)(2) does not endorse all
inconsistencies; neither alternative, hypothetical, nor inconsistent assertions are
permitted when they are interposed for an improper purpose under rule 11.”).
160. “Specifically, the question is whether Rule 8(e)(2) . . . permits [the party]
to plead as it did, and whether Rule 11 prevents such pleading.”  City of King-
sport v. Steel & Roof Structure, Inc., 500 F.2d 617, 619 (6th Cir. 1974); cf. Plumer,
supra note 24, at 422 (“Defining ‘improper purpose’ [within the meaning of Rule
11] . . . is the key to understanding why [Rule 8(e)(2)] undercuts judicial estoppel
only in certain circumstances.”).
161. See Jamison v. Consolidated Utils., Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102 (Alaska 1978)
(noting that the determination of whether the assertion of inconsistent positions
would be unconscionable “is essentially a factual one”).
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11 have held that the rule is violated by unconscionable conduct,162
and that this standard is satisfied where a party asserts a position
inconsistent with a previously successful position asserted in a
prior case.163  Under this view, quasi-estoppel could be applied
without running afoul of Rule 8(e)(2) where a party asserts a posi-
tion inconsistent with one on which it was successful in a previous
action164 because Rule 11 would have been violated (and Rule
8(e)(2) therefore does not apply) under those circumstances.165 In
other words, the assertion of inconsistent positions appears to be
unconscionable for purposes of both Rule 11166 and the quasi-
estoppel doctrine where the party has changed its position after
succeeding on the first assertion.167
Whether there are other circumstances in which the applica-
tion of quasi-estoppel can be reconciled with Rule 8(e)(2) is more
problematic.168  On one hand, there certainly would seem to be cir-
162. See Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah Ct. App.
1993); see also Mitchell v. Carmichael, 522 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tenn. 1975) (“Rule
11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure requires that no attorney engage in
. . . unconscionable litigation.”).
163. See Schoney, 863 P.2d at 62; see also In re Liberty Music & Video, Inc., 50
B.R. 379, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (concluding that Rule 11 was violated where a
party’s assertion of inconsistent positions appeared to be based solely upon
whether the first tribunal’s decisions “favored or hurt it”).
164. See City of Kingsport, 500 F.2d at 620 (“[C]ases where an estoppel has
been found to bar a party from asserting a position contrary to that relied on in an
earlier action, are cases where the party was successful in its initial reliance and
tried to change positions in subsequent litigation.”).
165. See Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d
1540, 1548 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Why should one be entitled to win the first suit by
demonstrating A and the second suit by demonstrating not-A?  One of these must
be wrong; indeed, inconsistency [under these circumstances] probably demon-
strates a violation of [Rule] 11.”).  See generally Schreiber, supra note 124, at 335
(observing that “Rule 8(e)(2) only allows inconsistent pleadings if they are made
in good faith,” and that a litigant “cannot in good faith ask a court to accept a po-
sition contrary to one asserted by the litigant and accepted by the court in a prior
litigation”).
166. See Schoney, 863 P.2d at 62.
167. This conclusion is suggested by the analysis in Jamison v. Consolidated
Utils., Inc., 576 P.2d 97 (Alaska 1978), where the court declined to apply quasi-
estoppel primarily because the party against whom the doctrine had been invoked
had not been successful in the proceeding in which the previous inconsistent posi-
tion had been taken.  See id. at 103.
168. On at least one occasion, the Alaska Supreme Court has indicated that, in
order to establish a violation of Rule 11 (which would preclude the application of
Rule 8(e)(2) and, correspondingly, permit the application of quasi-estoppel), a
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cumstances under which the assertion of inconsistent positions
might violate Rule 11, in which case Rule 8(e)(2) would not pre-
clude the application of quasi-estoppel, even though the party as-
serting inconsistent positions did not prevail on its initial asser-
tion.169 In addition, because Rule 8(e)(2)’s applicability may be
limited to the assertion of inconsistent positions within a single
proceeding,170 there is some basis for concluding that quasi-
estoppel would not conflict with the rule whenever the doctrine
was being applied to preclude the assertion of inconsistent posi-
tions in separate or successive actions,171 regardless of any Rule 11
violation.172
Nevertheless, it seems clear that quasi-estoppel is most easily
reconciled with Rule 8(e)(2) in cases where the party attempting to
assert inconsistent positions has prevailed as a result of its first as-
sertion.173 The extent to which there are other circumstances under
which the assertion of inconsistent positions could be precluded by
the quasi-estoppel doctrine without running afoul of Rule 8(e)(2)
                                                                                                                                
party need not demonstrate “subjective bad faith.”  Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska
Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1228 (Alaska 1992).
169. See, e.g., American Auto. Ass’n v. Rothman, 101 F. Supp. 193, 196
(E.D.N.Y. 1951) (indicating that a party’s assertion of a position inconsistent with
an allegation made in a pleading it filed less than six weeks earlier potentially
violated Rule 11); see also Plumer, supra note 24, at 423 n.96 (observing that a
party who was unsuccessful in asserting its initial position “does not necessarily
controvert . . . [R]ule 11 by changing positions in a second proceeding” (emphasis
added)); cf. Walker v. Walker, 854 F. Supp. 1443, 1463 (D. Neb. 1994)
(concluding that Rule 11 was not violated by a “factually well founded” assertion
that was inconsistent with a position the party had taken previously).
170. See Fay v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 647 N.E.2d 422, 426 n.10 (Mass.
1995) (interpreting the federal rule).
171. See, e.g., Yanez v. United States, 753 F. Supp. 309, 312 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
(“[T]his court interprets Rule 8(e)(2) to mean that parties can plead alternative
theories or claims in the same action, but not in separate actions.”), rev’d, 989
F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversing on the ground that the “claims are not incon-
sistent”).  See generally AFN, Inc. v. Schlott, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 219, 227 n.12
(D.N.J. 1992) (distinguishing between “intentional self-contradiction in separate
legal proceedings” and the “permissible practice” of pleading in the alternative).
172. In other words, Rule 8(e)(2)’s application may be limited to the assertion
of inconsistent positions in a “single suit,” irrespective of any limitations on the
rule’s applicability imposed by its express incorporation of Rule 11 standards.
Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1548
(7th Cir. 1990).
173. See Paschke v. Retool Indus., 519 N.W.2d 441, 444 n.4 (Mich. 1994)
(observing that “[t]he ‘prior success’ model is more narrowly tailored to allow for
alternative pleadings in the same or different proceedings”).
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is more difficult to predict, and probably must be resolved on a
fact-specific, case-by-case basis.174
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR A MORE PREDICTABLE
QUASI-ESTOPPEL TEST IN ALASKA
Due to the confusion and unpredictability caused by the
Alaska Supreme Court’s fact-specific analysis of such ambiguous
factors as unconscionability,175 the court should consider refining
and clarifying its test in order to make the quasi-estoppel doctrine
more useful to practitioners.  First, Alaska courts should require
that the two positions at issue necessarily and fully conflict in order
to be considered inconsistent.176  Second,  Alaska courts should
clarify that the inconsistent positions asserted need not be taken in
separate judicial proceedings.177 Third, the Alaska Supreme Court
should formally reject any privity requirement, given that the
courts, rather than individual litigants, are the intended benefici-
aries of the quasi-estoppel doctrine.178  Finally, consistent with the
goal of protecting the integrity of the judicial system, Alaska
courts should require those seeking quasi-estoppel to have acted in
good faith.179
A. The Genuine Inconsistency Requirement
The first issue to be determined in analyzing any quasi-
estoppel argument is whether the two positions at issue genuinely
174. See generally Plumer, supra note 24, at 422-23 (“[T]he circumstances ac-
companying a person’s intertrial inconsistency will determine whether such incon-
sistency is proper or improper for rule 11 purposes.”).
175. The courts generally recognize that quasi-estoppel is an amorphous doc-
trine.  Indeed, one court has noted that “[a]s much as in any area of the law, quasi
estoppel cases turn on the particular facts of each case.”  Mayer v. Mayer, 311
S.E.2d 659, 668 (N.C. App. 1984).  The Alaska Supreme Court itself has noted
that because quasi-estoppel is an equitable doctrine, one of its principal features
is its flexibility.  See In re Lampert, 896 P.2d 214, 221 (Alaska 1995).  Neverthe-
less, certain fundamental tenets of the doctrine have begun to emerge.  For ex-
ample, the doctrine can be applied “defensively,” either as an affirmative defense
or to preclude the assertion of an otherwise valid defense, but it cannot be in-
voked “offensively” to support an independent claim for relief.  See Bubbel v.
Wien Air Alaska, Inc., 682 P.2d 374, 380 n.7 (Alaska 1984).
176. See infra notes 180-205 and accompanying text.
177. See infra notes 206-17 and accompanying text.
178. See infra notes 218-24 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 225-34 and accompanying text.
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are inconsistent.180  In Municipality of Anchorage v. Leigh,181 for ex-
ample, the Alaska Supreme Court declined to apply quasi-estoppel
because the position asserted by the petitioner actually was consis-
tent with the previously asserted position alleged to be in con-
flict.182  In an action arising out of an automobile accident,183 the
court in Smith v. Thompson likewise held that the doctrine did not
preclude the defendant from asserting a statute of limitations de-
fense because there was no basis for concluding that he had previ-
ously taken a position inconsistent with the assertion of that de-
fense.184
As a practical matter, identifying genuine inconsistencies be-
tween two positions can be difficult.  The Alaska Supreme Court
has indicated that quasi-estoppel will apply only where it would be
unconscionable to permit a party to assert inconsistent positions.185
This “unconscionability” apparently may arise from the falsity of
either the initial position186 or the subsequent position,187 because
neither is, as a general proposition, necessarily more likely than
the other to be true.188
180. See, e.g., Smith v. Thompson, 923 P.2d 101, 105 (Alaska 1996) (holding
that quasi-estoppel applies only where a party is “asserting a position inconsistent
with one he had previously taken”).
181. 823 P.2d 1241 (Alaska 1992).
182. See id. at 1245-46.  The respondent argued that the petitioner was es-
topped from opposing a resolution of the constitutionality of a definitional provi-
sion in Alaska’s workers’ compensation laws on the basis of hypothetical facts be-
cause the petitioner had asserted in its petition for appellate review that “an
important constitutional question” was implicated by the provision.  Id.  The
Alaska Supreme Court rejected the respondent’s argument; because the petition
for review apparently included an assertion that the lower court’s decision im-
properly was based on hypothetical facts, the court concluded that the petitioner’s
position had not changed.  See id. at 1246.
183. See Smith, 923 P.2d at 102-03.
184. See id. at 104-05.
185. See Jamison v. Consolidated Utils., Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102 (Alaska 1978)
(citation omitted).
186. See Union Oil Co. v. Alaska, 804 P.2d 62, 66 n.7 (Alaska 1990) (observing
that the doctrine applies “where the circumstances of the new position would
render the previous position unconscionable”).
187. See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 102 (observing that the doctrine applies where
the “assertion of the second position [would be] unconscionable”).
188. See Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 603 (9th
Cir. 1996) (discussing judicial estoppel).  However, as a practical matter, it is the
assertion of the second position that is typically precluded by the doctrine’s appli-
cation.  See, e.g., Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1043 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (“Estoppel operates forward, not backward.  If there . . .[is] an  incon-
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Unfortunately, as of yet, there are no clear cut indications of
when an inconsistency will be deemed unconscionable.189  An
Oklahoma court has stated that “it is enough that the party plays
fast and loose with the courts by intentional self-contradiction as a
means of obtaining an unfair advantage.”190  Among other things,
the magnitude of the inconsistency between two positions has been
an important consideration in determining whether this standard
has been met, because the inconsistency clearly must be significant
before the doctrine will apply.191
As defining inconsistency on a case-by-case basis can be diffi-
cult and unpredictable, the Alaska Supreme Court should consider
adopting the bright line rule set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Ari-
zona v. Shamrock Foods Co.192  In that case, the court held that the
two positions asserted by a litigant must “necessarily” conflict in
order to be inconsistent.193  The adoption of such a rule would
benefit Alaska courts and litigants in two significant ways.  First, as
a practical matter, the rule would be predictable and much easier
to apply than the present fact-specific “unconscionability” test.
Second, as a matter of policy, a bright line rule would be consistent
with the truth-seeking function of the judicial process.
As the United States Supreme Court has stated, “[c]ourt pro-
ceedings are held for the solemn purpose of endeavoring to ascer-
                                                                                                                                
sistency between [a party’s] initial representation . . . and its later assertions . . .,
the first argument could estop the second, but the second could not estop the
first.”).  Cf. Rissetto, 94 F.3d at 603 (“The tribunal in which the litigant made the
first statement . . . is not in a position to do anything about it[].”).
189. Whether the assertion of inconsistent positions would be unconscionable
is essentially a factual question to be determined on a case-by-case basis.  See Ja-
mison, 576 P.2d at 101-02 & n.6.
190. Willard v. Ward, 875 P.2d 441, 443 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Cole-
man v. Southern Pac. Co., 296 P.2d 386, 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956)); see also Woods
v. Woods, 638 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (observing that “quasi es-
toppel . . . estops a party from playing fast and loose with the courts”).  Not sur-
prisingly, this standard has also been applied in evaluating the closely related ju-
dicial estoppel doctrine.  See, e.g.,  Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166-67
(4th Cir. 1982).
191. See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 102 (discussing the “importance of significant in-
consistency”).
192. 729 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1984).
193. See id. at 1215 (holding that plaintiffs were not estopped from alleging a
retail price-fixing conspiracy because the existence of a conspiracy at the whole-
sale level did not preclude the existence of an independent conspiracy at the retail
level).
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tain the truth which is the sine qua non of a fair trial.”194 Several
federal appellate courts have warned that the doctrine of judicial
estoppel is “at odds with the truth-seeking function of courts of
law.”195  This is because the application of the doctrine may prevent
a litigant from asserting facts even where they are true.  Presuma-
bly, Alaska’s doctrine of quasi-estoppel potentially could pose the
same danger.
By requiring that a party’s positions necessarily conflict before
invoking quasi-estoppel, the Alaska Supreme Court would avoid
jeopardizing the truth-seeking goal of the judicial process (because
two positions that necessarily conflict cannot possibly both be
true), while still protecting the integrity of the courts.  Further-
more, Alaska courts should allow exceptions where a new discov-
ery or material change of circumstances indicates that a litigant
had no knowledge of the falsity of a previously asserted position.196
This balancing of interests best would serve the policy objectives
underlying the quasi-estoppel doctrine without permitting litigants
to “blow hot and cold.”
A litigant’s full knowledge of the facts when asserting the ini-
tial position is characterized as a prerequisite to the doctrine’s ap-
plication, rather than simply as a factor to be considered in making
194. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965); see also United States v.
Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 908 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Truth is the essential objective of
our adversary system of justice.”).
195. American Methyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 749 F2d 826, 833 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(citation omitted), vacated on other grounds, 768 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see
also United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land, 802 F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1986)
(“[A]doption of judicial estoppel . . . would discourage the determination of cases
on the basis of the true facts as they might be established ultimately.” (authority
and internal quotation marks omitted)); Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 911
F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir. 1990) (indicating that the application of judicial estoppel
can “imping[e] on the truth-seeking function of the court because the doctrine
precludes a contradictory position without examining the truth of either state-
ment”).
196. See Mohamed v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 277, 281 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).  See also Henkin, supra note 122, at 1714 (observing that “there are certain
cases in which a litigant cannot help but assert inconsistent positions”).  A change
in circumstances is perhaps the most obvious example.  See Jamison v. Consoli-
dated Utils., Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102 (Alaska 1978) (observing that “changed cir-
cumstances [may] tend to justify . . . [an] inconsistency”).  Indeed, there actually
may be no inconsistency between two different positions where there has been a
“material change in circumstances in the interim.”  Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d
1033, 1043 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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the unconscionability determination.197  In order to satisfy this re-
quirement, the first assertion must have been informed and pur-
poseful,198 and not merely the result of a mistake on the part of the
party making it.199  This in turn suggests that the party must have
been cognizant of the ramifications of its representations and been
apprised of its legal rights in that regard.200 Whether the party acted
on the advice of counsel is an important consideration in analyzing
this issue because such advice indicates that the party was fully ap-
prised of the particulars.201
The Alaska Supreme Court has discussed certain circum-
stances in which the integrity of the court might be threatened
where parties have full knowledge that their assertions of inconsis-
tent positions constitute abuse of the judicial process.  In Maynard
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,202 the court indi-
cated that the assertion of a position at trial might be precluded by
the doctrine of quasi-estoppel where that position is inconsistent
with pre-litigation correspondence drafted by that party.203 Along
similar lines, the court in Smith v. Stratton204 estopped the defen-
dant from raising a statute of limitations defense where she had
requested and received two extensions of time to answer the com-
plaint.205  Although these cases do not apply to positions taken in a
197. See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 102 (“It is necessary . . . that any representation
made to the party claiming quasi-estoppel must have been based with [sic] full
knowledge of the facts.”) (citing Donaldson v. LeNore, 540 P.2d 671, 674 (Ariz.
1975)).
198. See In re Lampert, 896 P.2d 214, 221 (Alaska 1995).  The Alaska Supreme
Court has left open the question of whether constructive knowledge is sufficient
to satisfy this requirement.  See Keener v. State, 889 P.2d 1063, 1068 (Alaska
1995).
199. See Lampert, 896 P.2d at 221.
200. See Anderson v. Anderson, 585 P.2d 938, 946 (Haw. 1978).
201. See, e.g., Lampert, 896 P.2d at 221.
202. 902 P.2d 1328 (Alaska 1995).
203. See id. at 1330-31. However, in its most recent analysis of quasi-estoppel,
the Alaska Supreme Court refused to apply the doctrine where the alleged incon-
sistency was contained in a memorandum, prepared by an attorney, estimating a
company’s  damages in a particular case.  See Power Constructors, Inc. v. Taylor
& Hintze, Nos. S-7033, 7123, 7124, 1998 Alas. LEXIS 117, 10-11 (Alaska June 18,
1998).  Although the attorney’s assessment of damages was inconsistent with the
position adopted by the company at trial, the court held that the memorandum
was merely a tentative, “best case scenario” estimate, particularly given that the
memorandum explicitly reserved the company’s right to change its position on
damages.  See id.
204. 835 P.2d 1162 (Alaska 1992).
205. See id. at 1166.
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formal judicial proceeding, these decisions suggest that where a
party attempts to improve his litigation position by asserting in-
consistent positions with full knowledge of the facts, it would be
unconscionable to allow him to prevail.
B. The Prior Judicial Success Requirement
In addition to requiring genuine inconsistency, it would be
useful for Alaska courts to specify whether the inconsistent posi-
tion at issue in a given case must have been successfully asserted in
a prior judicial proceeding.  As noted above, the majority of juris-
dictions adopting judicial estoppel require a party’s prior inconsis-
tent position to be judicially adopted before invoking the doc-
trine.206 Alaska courts do not appear to require such judicial
success.  For example, in the Lampert case discussed above, the
plaintiff was estopped from contesting his conveyance of property
to his stepdaughter, despite the fact that there was no prior court
proceeding.207
Consistent with prior Alaska case law, the Alaska courts
should not require prior judicial success before invoking quasi-
estoppel.  Rather, because unconscionability lies at the heart of the
doctrine, the courts should consider whether the integrity of the
judicial system would be jeopardized if quasi-estoppel were not in-
voked.  An analysis of whether unconscionability exists should turn
on whether the party asserting inconsistent positions gained an ad-
vantage or produced a disadvantage by doing so.208
Alaska courts do not appear to require that an inconsistent
position have been asserted in a prior judicial proceeding, but, an
important consideration in analyzing the unconscionability issue is
whether the party asserting inconsistent positions gained an advan-
tage through the assertion of the first position,209 and whether the
party invoking quasi-estoppel relied on the inconsistency to its det-
riment.210 In KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City,211 for example, the Idaho Su-
206. See, e.g., Stevens Technical Servs., Inc. v. Steamship Brooklyn, 885 F.2d
584, 588 (9th Cir. 1989); Yanez v. United States, 753 F.Supp. 309, 313 n.3 (N.D.
Cal. 1990), rev’d, 989 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1993).
207. See In re Lampert, 896 P.2d 214, 221 (Alaska 1995).
208. See, e.g., id.
209. See id.  However, it apparently is “not necessary for the estopped party to
have gained any tangible advantage from the transaction.  Rather, it is sufficient
to show that the party seeking estoppel would suffer a distinct disadvantage from
the change in position.”  Id. at 221 n.9.
210. See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 102-03.  While reliance is not a prerequisite to
the application of quasi-estoppel, it is a factor to be considered in analyzing the
unconscionability issue.  See id. at 102.
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preme Court indicated that prejudice to the person invoking quasi-
estoppel is a prerequisite to the doctrine’s application.212 The
Alaska Supreme Court subsequently cited KTVB with approval213
in declining to apply quasi-estoppel where the invoking parties had
not been prejudiced by the inconsistency.214 In short, not only is
prejudice to the party invoking quasi-estoppel relevant to a deter-
mination of whether the assertion of inconsistent positions would
be unconscionable,215 it may well be the single most important con-
sideration in analyzing that issue.216
As noted above, Alaska courts should also require that the
party attempting to assert inconsistent positions do so with full
knowledge of all the facts, before applying quasi-estoppel.217  Prior
judicial success should not be an absolute requirement for adopt-
ing quasi-estoppel; yet it should be a factor in whether the doctrine
is applied.
C. The “Mutuality” or “Privity” Requirement
In an effort to clear up any remaining confusion, Alaska
courts formally should reject any “mutuality” or “privity” re-
quirement in connection with the quasi-estoppel doctrine.  In the
estoppel context, “mutuality” or “privity” refers to a requirement
that “both the party asserting estoppel and the party against whom
estoppel was asserted in the second action had to have been parties
                                                                                                                                
211. 486 P.2d 992 (Idaho 1971).
212. See id. at 995 (describing “detriment . . . [to] the person seeking applica-
tion of the doctrine” as a “requirement[] for proper application of quasi estop-
pel”).
213. See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 101-02 n.6.  The KTVB court in turn had quoted
from Godoy v. County of Hawaii, 354 P.2d 78 (Haw. 1960), a case upon which the
Alaska Supreme Court has relied in analyzing the quasi-estoppel doctrine.  See
KTVB, 486 P.2d at 994; see also supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
214. See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 103.
215. See Alaska Statebank v. Kirschbaum, 662 P.2d 939, 943 (Alaska 1983).
216. See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 102 n.6 (“The requirements for proper applica-
tion of quasi-estoppel are . . . that the person against whom it is sought to be ap-
plied has previously taken an inconsistent position . . . to the detriment of the per-
son seeking application of the doctrine.” (quoting KTVB, 486 P.2d at 995)); see
also University of Hawaii Prof’l Assembly v. University of Hawaii, 659 P.2d 720,
725 (Haw. 1983) (“[Q]uasi estoppel is grounded on the equitable principle that
one should not be permitted to take a position inconsistent with a previous posi-
tion if the result is to harm another.”), cited with approval in In re Lampert, 896
P.2d 214, 221 (Alaska 1995).
217. See supra notes 196-205 and accompanying text.
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to the first action.”218 The Alaska appellate courts have not consid-
ered specifically whether the requirement applies to the applica-
tion of quasi-estoppel.219 However, the Alaska Supreme Court gen-
erally has abandoned any mutuality requirement in other estoppel
contexts,220 and there is little basis for concluding that its analysis of
the quasi-estoppel doctrine would differ.221  Thus, at a minimum,
Alaska courts should hold that the doctrine can be invoked by a
litigant who was not a party to the prior proceedings222 (although
perhaps not against such a litigant),223 which is typically the result
reached in cases applying the closely related judicial estoppel doc-
trine.224 This result would be consistent with the doctrine’s goal of
protecting the integrity of the courts rather than promoting fair-
ness between individual litigants.
D. The Clean Hands Doctrine
Finally, Alaska courts should invoke the doctrine of quasi-
estoppel only when the parties seeking the estoppel have not en-
gaged in any wrongdoing in connection with the matters being liti-
218. State v. Kott, 636 P.2d 622, 625 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981), aff’d, 678 P.2d 386
(Alaska 1984).
219. This issue also has rarely arisen in other jurisdictions.  However, at least
one court has concluded that a party who lacks privity cannot invoke the doctrine.
See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Moore, 386 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
220. See, e.g., State v. United Cook Inlet Drift Ass’n, 895 P.2d 947, 951-52
(Alaska 1995) (declining to adopt an exception to the applicability of nonmutual
collateral estoppel for the state government).
221. But see Pennington v. Snow, 471 P.2d 370, 377 (Alaska 1970) (“If the par-
ticular circumstances of the prior adjudication would make it unfair to allow a
person who was not a party to the first [proceeding] to invoke . . . estoppel then
the requirement of mutuality must still be applied.”).
222. But cf. Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964) (holding that
“[q]uasi-estoppel . . . arises only in favor of the parties to the first suit and those in
privity with them”).
223. Cf. Murray v. Feight, 741 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Alaska 1987) (holding that re-
lated collateral estoppel doctrine “must be asserted against a party or one in priv-
ity with a party to the first action”).
224. See, e.g., Lillo v. Thee, 676 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (“The doc-
trine of judicial estoppel, which is grounded in public policy, holds that a person
who states facts under oath, during the course of a trial, is estopped to deny such
facts in a second suit, even though the parties in the second suit may not be the
same as those in the first.”).  However, the court in Swilley held that only parties
to the initial proceeding (and their privies) can invoke quasi-estoppel, even
though judicial estoppel generally can be invoked “by strangers to the record in
the former proceeding.”  Swilley, 374 S.W.2d at 875.
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gated.  “Clean hands” is an equitable doctrine225 requiring those
seeking equitable relief, such as that provided by quasi estoppel, to
have acted in good faith.226 Although the Alaska Supreme Court
indicated in In re Lampert227 that the doctrine of clean hands may
limit the application of quasi-estoppel, the Court was not required
to decide that issue because wrongdoing on the part of the party
invoking quasi-estoppel was not present in the case.228
Nevertheless, the Alaska Supreme Court has applied the clean
hands doctrine to preclude the application of other forms of estop-
pel.229 It also has observed that quasi-estoppel is an equitable doc-
trine,230 and that a party “seeking to invoke equitable principles
must come before the court with clean hands”231 – that is, “[e]quity
requires that those who seek it shall have acted fairly and without
fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue.”232  This analysis cer-
tainly suggests that the clean hands doctrine should be applied to
limit the application of quasi-estoppel,233 although technically this
still may be an open question in Alaska.234
VII.     CONCLUSION
In summary, quasi-estoppel is an equitable doctrine that may
preclude a party from taking a position that is inconsistent with
one it previously asserted.235  Quasi-estoppel differs in certain im-
portant respects from other related estoppel doctrines recognized
225. See Wirum & Cash Architects v. Cash, 837 P.2d 692, 708 n.24 (Alaska
1992).
226. See Knaebel v. Heiner, 663 P.2d 551, 554 (Alaska 1983).
227. 896 P.2d 214 (Alaska 1995).
228. See id. at 222 n.11.
229. See, e.g., Alaska Continental Bank v. Anchorage Commercial Land As-
socs., 781 P.2d 562, 565 n.6 (Alaska 1989) (discussing equitable estoppel).
230. See Bromley v. Mitchell, 902 P.2d 797, 802 (Alaska 1995); Lampert, 896
P.2d at 220.
231. Alaska Continental, 781 P.2d at 565 n.6.
232. Sea Lion Corp. v. Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc., 787 P.2d 109, 114 n.2
(Alaska 1990).  This is the standard the Alaska Supreme Court had previously
articulated in defining the clean hands doctrine.  See Knaebel v. Heiner, 663 P.2d
551, 554 (Alaska 1983).
233. See Merdes v. Underwood, 742 P.2d 245, 248-49 & n.4 (Alaska 1987)
(stating, in a case involving both equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel, that
“[u]sually a person cannot claim the benefit of estoppel if he himself has acted
unfairly”).
234. See generally Stuebner Realty 19, Ltd. v. Cravens Road 88, Ltd., 817
S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex. App. 1991) (discussing the apparent dearth of “case law
holding that ‘clean hands’ are required to assert the defense of quasi estoppel”).
235. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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in Alaska,236 principally by focusing on whether the assertion of in-
consistent positions would be unconscionable.237  Unfortunately,
present case law offers relatively little guidance with respect to
when the assertion of inconsistent positions will be deemed uncon-
scionable.238  While unconscionability presumably will be found
where the assertion of inconsistent positions would be grossly un-
fair, unjust, inequitable, oppressive, or unduly harsh, the term has
not been more specifically defined by the Alaska courts.239  Be-
cause the term has not been defined, the issue ordinarily must be
resolved on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis, as borne out by the
Alaska cases that have analyzed the quasi-estoppel doctrine.240
Because confusion and unpredictability may result from
Alaska’s present formulation of the quasi-estoppel doctrine, the
Alaska Supreme Court should consider refining its test.  Specifi-
cally, the court should consider imposing a requirement that the
inconsistent positions at issue “necessarily conflict.”241  While the
inconsistent positions probably need not be taken in separate judi-
cial proceedings,242 Alaska courts should continue to require that
the party against whom quasi-estoppel is invoked have gained an
advantage or produced a disadvantage243 with full knowledge of the
facts.244  Finally, while Alaska courts should reject any privity re-
quirement with respect to quasi-estoppel,245 the courts should con-
sider the identity of the party seeking to invoke the doctrine and
ensure that the party has acted in good faith.246 These requirements
would further the principal goal of quasi-estoppel, which is to pro-
tect the integrity of the judicial process.247  Furthermore, clarifica-
tion of the prerequisites for application of quasi-estoppel would
make the doctrine a more valuable tool for everyone involved in
litigation.
236. See supra notes 23-61 and accompanying text.
237. See Jamison v. Consolidated Utils., Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102 (Alaska 1978).
238. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
239. See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 102 n.7 (citing cases from other jurisdictions con-
struing unconscionability).
240. See supra notes 79-116 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 180-205 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 218-24 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 225-34 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
